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Fairness in International Trade:  
the case of Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
Geoff Moore 
Durham Business School, Durham University, U.K. 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter begins by setting out the background to international trade relations between the 
European Commission and developing countries before turning to look at Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) themselves in more detail and the effects that have been 
predicted on the developing countries if EPAs were to be introduced in the way envisaged. 
The chapter then comments briefly on a “Stop EPAs” campaign that has been run by NGOs 
for a number of years, before presenting and commenting on the current position showing 
which EPAs have been signed. The literature on fairness in international trade is then 
reviewed and, to some extent, extended and applied to the case of EPAs. Conclusions which, 
as might be predicted, are somewhat tentative, but do raise some new issues are then drawn. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Any attempt to define fairness in global trade relations should teach humility.” 
Brown & Stern (2007: 316) 
 
There are, perhaps, three reasons why humility is both required and will be learned from 
studying fairness in international trade. The first is due to the inherent complexity of 
international trade relations, which makes any attempt to grasp them difficult and the danger 
of over-simplification rife. The second is that, if it were possible to adequately summarise 
even a particular aspect of such relations, the application of fairness principles is by no means 
straightforward. While there have been numerous attempts to apply such principles, so that in 
one sense the ground is well-trodden, the judgements that emerge do not necessarily bring the 
kind of clarity that might be desired – in other words, judgments that such and such a practice 
is unfair and should be changed, or otherwise, are few and far between. Brown & Stern, cited 
above, continue: “even if we could transcend the self-serving bias inherent in the judgment of 
all interested parties, there is still no conclusive and incontrovertible way of assessing 
fairness” (2007: 316). And this leads to the third reason why humility will be required and 
learned, which is that fairness judgements on particular aspects of international trade 
relations, even if they were to be clear and unequivocal, may not lead to any change by those 
deemed to have infringed fairness towards those who are on the receiving end of such acts. 
Humility is involved in finding that one‟s work may lead to nothing substantive by way of 
change „on the ground‟ – where it really matters. 
 
Despite these three reasons, any one of which might seem to be enough to persuade one not 
to embark on this particular journey, this chapter sets out to explore the case of Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These are bilateral trade agreements between the European 
Commission (EC) and various groupings of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, 
which have been the subject of intense negotiations leading up to and beyond the deadline of 
31
st
 December 2007 by which all such agreements were due to be set in place. The case of 
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EPAs, therefore, provides both a timely and an excellent test case for exploring the fairness 
or otherwise of trade relations between developed and developing countries. 
 
The chapter begins by setting out the background to international trade relations between the 
EC and developing countries before turning to look at EPAs themselves in more detail and 
the effects that have been predicted on the developing countries if EPAs were to be 
introduced in the way envisaged, together with a number of associated issues related to the 
introduction of EPAs. The chapter then comments briefly on a “Stop EPAs” campaign that 
has been run by NGOs for a number of years, before presenting and commenting on the 
current position showing which EPAs have been signed. The literature on fairness in 
international trade is then reviewed and, to some extent, extended and applied to the case of 
EPAs. Conclusions which, as might already be predicted, are somewhat tentative, but do raise 
some new issues are then drawn. 
 
 
The background to EU-ACP international trade relations 
 
When the European Communities, as they were originally known, were founded in 1957 by 
the Treaty of Rome they rapidly established preferential relations with the ACP countries that 
had recently gained independence from their former colonial masters (Lang 2006: 1). From 
1975 until 2001 trade relations between what became the European Union (EU) and the ACP 
countries were governed by the four Lomé Conventions. These represented a form of the 
EU‟s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which “put ACP countries at the top of the 
pyramid of preferences granted by the EU to developing countries” (Ochieng 2007: 367). 
These have provided ACP countries with “a very favourable trade regime, a substantial aid 
budget, and a set of joint institutions” which has meant that “ACP exporters have generally 
enjoyed a tax advantage over some of their competitors when selling products facing tariffs 
into the European market” (Stevens 2006: 442). These trade relations have been non-
reciprocal in the sense that ACP countries have not been required to assume corresponding 
obligations to allow tax advantages to imports originating in EU countries (Ochieng 2007: 
367).
1
  
 
However, such non-reciprocal arrangements have become increasingly open to challenge in 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) because they were seen to discriminate against other 
developing countries (Powell 2007: 8). There is, therefore, immediately an issue of fairness 
between one set of developing countries and another set, as well as the possibility that such 
other developing countries might mount a legal challenge based on the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV (see further below). Indeed Peter Mandelson, the 
former European Commissioner for Trade since 2004, has claimed that “other developing 
countries are watching these final stages of our negotiations [over EPAs] like hawks” 
(Mandelson 2007), precisely to ensure fair treatment between all parties and the end of 
preferential treatment to ACPs. Despite this, there are a number of “special and differential 
                                                 
1
 Such preferential treatment is allowable under what is known as the “Enabling Clause”, but is officially the 
“Decision on differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of developing 
countries” that was adopted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1979. The Enabling 
Clause provides the legal basis for the World Trade Organisation‟s (WTO) GSP by which developed countries 
offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment (e.g. zero or low duties on imports) to products which originate in 
developing countries. Preference-giving countries can unilaterally decide which countries and which products to 
include. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm, accessed 
12/12/08. 
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treatment” (SDT) provisions, most notably the notion of non-reciprocity, that are enshrined in 
GATT articles and the Enabling Clause (Ochieng 2007: 391 and see Ochieng 2007: 367 and 
Footnote 1) which might allow more flexibility. 
 
The successor to the Lomé Conventions between the EU and ACP countries was the Cotonou 
Agreement which was signed in 2000 for a period of 20 years. This Agreement “aims to 
promote economic growth and development as well as the smooth and gradual integration of 
ACP states into the world economy” (Borrmann & Busse 2007: 403). Although a 20 year 
Agreement, from a trade perspective the time period is shorter because of the WTO-
compatibility issue identified above. Thus, at the WTO Doha conference in November 2001 a 
temporary waiver was granted giving a deadline by which WTO-compatible reciprocal trade 
agreements had to be signed of 31
st
 December 2007. It has been the prospect of the end of 
this temporary waiver that has led to the negotiation of the EPAs which are the subject of this 
chapter.  
 
The Cotonou Agreement placed these new arrangements under the jurisdiction of GATT 
Article XXIV whereas previously under the Lomé Conventions the arrangements were under 
the jurisdiction of the Enabling Clause. Article XXIV governs Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) between states or groupings of states, and includes the requirement that FTAs must 
eliminate tariff barriers on “substantially all trade” (SAT) within a “reasonable length of 
time” (see Lang 2006, Ochieng 2007, Powell 2007). Article XXIV defines the time period 
stating that it should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases, such exceptions requiring 
specific justification. The exact definition of “substantially all trade”, however, is not 
provided for within the Article but is usually taken to mean a minimum of 80% (Busse & 
Grossmann 2007: 808) allowing flexibility both over which 20% is omitted and whether this 
is divided equally. Lang (2006: 12-13), however, states that the EU has traditionally argued 
that liberalisation should extend to 90% of existing trade, but that this might be split unevenly 
so that, for example, the EU could accept full liberalisation of 100% with ACP countries 
committing to 80%. We will return to both these issues – of how much liberalisation and over 
what period – when considering EPAs in more detail below. 
 
Despite the requirement to negotiate revised and reciprocal trade agreements, the Cotonou 
Agreement, as noted above, is more broadly based and includes specific provisions for 
development strategies and priority for the objective of poverty reduction, and a special focus 
on the Millennium Development Goals.
2
 There is also a provision for a transitional period of 
up to at least 12 years on the new trade agreements, apparently in contradiction of the 10 year 
maximum under Article XXIV,
3
 although the U.K.‟s Department for International 
Development (DFID) suggests such periods may be as much as 25 years.
4
  Both Powell 
(2007: 8) and Ochieng (2007: 382-3) draw attention to the objective of EPAs within the 
Cotonou Agreement as follows: “Economic and trade cooperation shall aim at fostering the 
smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy, with due regard 
                                                 
2
 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm?CFID=2311138&CFTOKEN=de5549ec566
e53bc-44BE1EAC-BCAD-6AE3-85FE869240E498A7&jsessionid=243062fb88384a375d62, accessed 
12/12/08. 
3
 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm?CFID=2311138&CFTOKEN=de5549ec566
e53bc-44BE1EAC-BCAD-6AE3-85FE869240E498A7&jsessionid=243062fb88384a375d62, accessed 
12/12/08. 
4
 See, www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/economic-partnership-agreements.asp, accessed 12/12/08. 
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for their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting sustainable 
development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries”. 
 
This leads us on to consider two other aspects of the context within which EPAs have been 
negotiated. The first is the WTO itself which has become the subject of bitter dispute and 
anti-globalization protests such as those at Seattle (Elsig 2007: 75). While providing, as we 
have seen, the overall legal context within which trade agreements such as FTAs are to be 
negotiated by those countries which have chosen to become WTO members (such that GATT 
Article XXIV, for example, forms part of WTO Law – Ochieng 2007: 365), there remains a 
dispute over whether the WTO is a trade rather than development organisation, and so 
whether it should or should not “be burdened by broad development concerns of which it has 
no comparative institutional advantage” (Ochieng 2007: 383). Not surprisingly the EU takes 
a pro-trade stance in which trade liberalisation, greater integration of the world economy, the 
increasing role of the market and a correspondingly diminishing role of the state all form key 
elements. However, “ACP countries and a number of scholars object to this conception of the 
objects and purposes of both EPAs and the WTO” (ibid.: 384, and see also Griffith & Powell 
2007: 7-11).  
 
The Doha Development Round of the WTO which began in 2001, was suspended in July 
2006 and resumed in February 2007, had, as its name suggests, a fundamental focus on the 
needs of developing countries and has foundered on the issues of market access and 
agricultural subsidies (IDC 2007: 10). Negotiations may, however, now be moving towards 
some form of resolution.
5
  The point in relation to EPAs, however, is that their WTO-
compatibility, while not in dispute in itself and, indeed, part of the Cotonou Agreement (Lang 
2006: 2), is subject to disagreement over what precisely such compatibility entails. Ochieng, 
for example, argues that the EU takes a literal (textual) approach to the interpretation of WTO 
laws, an approach described as “legally problematic and relatively developmentally 
restrictive compared to the ACP‟s teleological approach to interpretation – a holistic 
examination involving textual, contextual and case law analyses of specific WTO 
Agreements, and assessment of the objects and purposes of the WTO” (Ochieng 2007: 364). 
Thus, not only are specific issues such as GATT Article XXIV open to renegotiation (Lang 
2006), but the purpose of the WTO itself continues to be the subject of contention. 
 
The final contextual issue that we need to take account of is the economic situation and trade 
objectives of the ACP countries. In 1976, just after the first Lomé Convention was 
introduced, the ACP states accounted for 6.7% of the EU market, while by 2005 it accounted 
for only 3% (see Borrmann & Busse 2007: 403). ACP‟s trade with the rest of the world has 
also fallen over the same period (Ochieng 2007: 377-8). In addition, about 68% of total ACP 
exports to the EU consists of agricultural goods and raw materials, with ten products 
accounting for some 74% of this (Borrmann & Busse 2007: 404). This is, of course, despite 
the trade preferences that the ACP countries have enjoyed over many decades. Thus, while 
trade with the EU continues to be important to ACP countries, there is evidence that it is in 
decline, at least proportionately, and that primary commodities continue to form a substantial 
part with little apparent progression to added value processed goods. Additional preferences 
on market access are, therefore, unlikely to benefit ACP countries in the future (ibid.: 404). 
 
Perhaps associated with the decline in international trade, the African countries within the 
ACP have long held the view that regional integration leading eventually to full continental 
                                                 
5
 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm, accessed 12/12/08. 
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integration is a desirable objective (see Powell 2007: 18-23). Thus, there have been various 
regional groupings involving more than 20 economic co-operation arrangements and, while 
the success of these groupings is not proven and their considerable overlapping membership 
remain problematic (Powell 2007: 22, Stevens 2006: 445), the vision of regional integration 
remains and has recently been reinforced by the establishment of the African Union 
(succeeding the Organisation of African Unity) and the founding of the New Partnership for 
Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) (Powell 2007: 23).  
 
Associated with this, the negotiations between the EC and ACP countries have been 
conducted not on a country-by-country basis, but between the EC and six regional groupings 
– four in Africa and one each in the Caribbean and Pacific. The groupings and countries 
within each group are shown in Appendix 1. Within each of these groupings it will be noted 
that there is a mixture of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and others generally known as 
developing countries. While the United Nations maintains a precise definition and listing of 
the 50 LDCs in the world,
6
 no official definition and listing of developing countries exists. In 
relation to EPAs the fact that each grouping contains a mixture is important, for under WTO 
rules developed countries can give non-reciprocal access to only two groups – either to LDCs 
only or to all developing countries.
7
 Thus, it would be possible to negotiate different 
agreements with the two different types of countries within a regional grouping but 
potentially problematic to negotiate one overall regional agreement – a point to which we will 
return. 
 
Given that negotiations were always likely, and have proven, to be problematic, one 
obvious question has to do with the fall-back position should such negotiations fail. Here, a 
further reason for difficulties associated with combinations of LDC and other developing 
countries within one regional grouping emerges. For LDCs a system known as “Everything 
But Arms” (EBA) exists. This was adopted by the EC in February 2001, granting duty-free 
access to imports of all products from all LDCs without any quantitative restrictions, except 
to arms and munitions. The EBA Regulation foresees that the special arrangements for 
LDCs should be maintained for an unlimited period of time and not be subject to the 
periodic renewal of the EC‟s scheme of generalised preferences.8   
However, for non-LDCs a more restrictive GSP+ scheme, approved in June 2005, exists. To 
qualify for this a large number of good governance and economic conventions have to be 
implemented, which most ACP countries have not ratified,
9
 and even then “this would mean 
less-favourable access to the EU market than the one granted under … the Cotonou 
Agreement and thus a decline in their export earnings from the EU market” (Busse & 
Grossman 2007: 788). For this reason non-LDCs have been keener to sign up to EPAs than 
their LDC regional partners which have less to lose – a source of tension within some of the 
regional groups (see Borrmann & Busse 2007: 408). An illustration of the effects on non-
LDCs is given in Ross (2007) citing the case of a Ghanaian pineapple producer with a 
turnover around $50 million supplying to the U.K. supermarket chain Marks and Spencer. 
Once the tariff-free status is removed, the juice products would become immediately 
unviable. If prices with European supermarkets could not be renegotiated, the company 
                                                 
6
 See www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm, accessed 12/12/08. 
7
 See, for example, www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/economic-partnership-agreements.asp, accessed 
12/12/08. 
8
 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/eba/index_en.htm, accessed 12/12/08. 
9
 See www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/economic-partnership-agreements-myths.asp, accessed 12/12/08. 
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might be forced to consider relocating – presumably to a LDC where the tariff-free status 
would remain. 
 
 
Economic Partnership Agreements and their predicted effects and associated issues 
 
With this as background, we are now in a position to look in more detail at EPAs themselves, 
their predicted effects and a number of associated issues. Given the requirement to have new 
trade agreements in place by the end of 2007, negotiations started in September 2002 but, as 
might be expected from the discussion above, have not progressed smoothly. This is despite 
the fact that, at least according to DFID, EPAs “are intended to be instruments for 
development, as opposed to standard trade agreements” with the aim being that ACPs 
“gradually build their capacity to compete in world markets”.10  This was expected to be a 
three-stage process first with regional integration within ACP regions, then with integration 
with the EU so that the EU market is slowly opened up, and finally integration as a whole 
with the world economy. At first sight, therefore, EPAs seem to be simple replacements for 
the WTO-incompatible agreements and to be beneficial to ACP countries, preserving the 
preferential treatment that has long been afforded to these countries and leading to regional 
and world integration.  
 
What, then, are the concerns that have meant that EPAs have become the subject of such 
concern within ACP countries themselves and have led to a campaign by various NGOs 
against the EC? The main point of concern, as we noted above, is that these new agreements 
must be reciprocal if they are to be WTO-compatible, and this therefore involves liberalising 
substantially all trade and within a reasonable period. But, while such liberalisation has been 
the main source of concern, there have been a number of other associated issues. All in all, 
we can identify five such issues. 
 
The first is the effects of EPAs on regional integration which, as we saw above, is a key 
objective particularly of African countries. There is a potentially negative effect on African 
regional integration with regional groups splintering between those countries which are 
willing to liberalise and those which are not (Stevens 2006: 446). This could cause regional 
realignments and, because of the possibility of differential liberalisation schedules, make 
regional partners reluctant to open their borders to trade with each other – making smuggling 
across borders a possibility (ibid.: 451). Powell (2007: 5-6) cites United Nations research 
estimating that West African countries would experience net trade diversion amounting to 
US$365 million of which US$35.6 million represents foregone exports from the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the rest of the region. Stevens concludes, 
“All in all, the outlook for EPAs to support regional integration is not good” (2006: 455). 
 
The second issue is an associated argument against EPAs put forward by Borrmann & Busse 
(2007). Their concern is with the quality of institutions and in particular market entry 
regulations for starting a business, the efficiency of the tax system and labour market 
regulation (Borrmann & Busse 2007: 406). Where these are in place and not excessive there 
is a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and growth, whereas the opposite is true 
where the institutional arrangements are poor. Analysing the ACP countries on this basis they 
find that there is limited concern in the Caribbean and Pacific countries due to the stage of 
                                                 
10
 See www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/economic-partnership-agreements.asp, accessed 12/12/08. 
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institutional development already achieved. For the four African regions, however, the story 
is very different: “the large majority of African countries [33 out of 46]11 … are not likely to 
benefit from an increase in trade due to EPAs” (ibid.: 407). Hence, they argue that “reform of 
the institutional frameworks should be an important topic on the EPA agenda” (ibid.: 407), 
but are not convinced that even then, and even with appropriate aid assistance, sufficient time 
exists for such reforms to be introduced – a further point in relation to the “within a 
reasonable length of time” issue noted above. Borrmann & Busse (2007: 414) also note that 
larger or more powerful countries with good institutions may then force weaker countries into 
EPAs when the effects on the weaker countries may be for them to suffer rather than benefit. 
The alternative is the undermining of regional integration if they opt out of the EPA process – 
as we have already noted above. 
 
The third issue, which follows from the first two, is the trade and fiscal impact of EPAs. As 
might be expected, various assessments of such effects have been made. Lang (2006: 13) 
compares the impact of EPAs under three scenarios – full reciprocal liberalisation; 
asymmetrical liberalisation (EU 100%, ACP 80%, SAT = 90%) under the EU‟s classic 
interpretation; and a larger degree of asymmetry (EU 100%, ACP 60%, SAT = 80%). The 
most favourable, of course, is the last scenario and only here does GDP increase for ACP 
countries though there are still fiscal losses due to reduced tariff income. The effect of 
reciprocity on the consequent reduction in revenues from tariffs is illustrated by the case of 
Zambia which would lose $15.8m per year – the equivalent of its annual HIV/Aids budget 
(Bunting 2007). 
 
Busse & Grossmann (2007) look specifically at the trade and fiscal impact on West African 
countries. While the detailed results that they present are beyond the scope of this chapter, 
their conclusions are instructive. Assuming complete tariff liberalisation, trade creation 
would exceed trade diversion in all West African countries, with total imports from EU 
countries also increasing in all countries (ibid.: 795). The effect on government revenues, 
however, is a decline of between 4% and 9% in most West African countries, although Cape 
Verde and Gambia would be more seriously affected (ibid.: 808). Since full liberalisation is 
unlikely the actual effects would be smaller, but nonetheless Busse & Grossman conclude 
that since “tariff revenue is a significant source of financing government expenditures in most 
of the West African countries … the most urgent task … will be to take measures to offset the 
decline…” (ibid.: 809), though they note the difficulties inherent in replacing this funding 
with domestic taxation. “To sum up”, they say, “negotiations on EPAs pose a major 
challenge to West African countries. While there is little doubt that West African countries 
would benefit from improved or more secure access to EU markets, it is not clear whether it 
is in the interest of West African countries to eliminate customs duties for almost all EU 
products by 2020” and they call for the well-designed opening up of domestic markets “with 
specific attention given to country specifics and capabilities” (ibid.: 809). This echoes the call 
by Borrmann & Busse (2007: 414) for a high degree of flexibility in the EPA process if pro-
development outcomes are to be achieved. 
 
Anderson & van der Mensbrugghe (2007) studied the specific case of Uganda. They compare 
full mutual liberalisation (including the removal of developed countries‟ agricultural 
subsidies) with two alternative scenarios. The first is a multilateral partial reform under the 
WTO‟s Doha round and the second is under EPAs. Again, the details of the findings need not 
concern us, but the conclusions are that “Uganda is not likely to gain a lot – and may even 
                                                 
11
 Countries included in the analysis differ very slightly from those in Appendix 1. 
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lose very slightly – from further reducing its tariffs, and likewise from the EU waiving the 
remaining tariffs on imports from Uganda and other ACP countries” (ibid.: 548). They stress 
that this does not mean that there is no need for Uganda and its ACP partners to undertake 
further trade reform, but again it seems that the conditions need to be right for Uganda to 
benefit significantly from trade liberalisation. 
 
More anecdotal evidence from NGOs indicates the actual effects of rapid trade liberalisation 
„on the ground‟. A Traidcraft report showed that Jamaica‟s dairy market liberalisation 
“decimated small farmers, left local milk production with barely a tenth of the market, and 
led to the EU supplying two-thirds of the island‟s milk powder”, while a “Christian Aid 
assessment of tomato liberalisation in Senegal showed that the local price halved, while 
imports of EU paste increased twenty-fold” (Cobham & Powell: 2007). These may be 
anecdotal but the effects on actual people in ACP countries reminds us that statistics 
ultimately mean people and communities. 
 
This collection of evidence then, albeit based mainly and necessarily on a forecasting of the 
effects, indicates that ACP countries are unlikely to benefit directly from EPAs. Nor should 
this surprise us, given the evidence that exists generally on trade liberalisation. Ochieng 
(2007: 377-8) summarises this well: 
 
 “The relationship between trade and growth has been shown to be complex, if not 
ambiguous … there is little evidence that trade liberalization is correlated with 
economic growth, poverty reduction, or economic development. Whilst no country 
has developed successfully by turning its back on international trade, none has 
developed by simply liberalizing its trade. The critical balance lies in each country 
adopting its own trade and investment policies and strategies, in line with its 
development needs … [A]nalysis of trade, economic growth and poverty reduction 
needs to go beyond trade liberalization to include inter alia: the relationships between 
trade and inequality, trade and employment, bargaining power in global production 
chains and the distribution of gains from trade, the effects of trends in, and variability 
of terms of trade on poverty, the effects of primary commodity dependence, and the 
relationship between export and import instability and vulnerability.” 
 
Again the evidence in favour of the flexibility of individual countries to determine their own 
development needs is clear. 
 
This brings us to the fourth issue of concern and one which is also related to the issue of 
flexibility. This is that the EC has attempted to include what are known as the “Singapore 
Issues” on the agenda within the negotiations on EPAs. These relate to investment, 
competition, government procurement and services, and the EC‟s position is that these should 
also be subject to negotiation within EPAs apparently “in order to achieve ACP development 
objectives” (Griffith & Powell 2007: 8). ACP countries, by contrast, have generally indicated 
that they do not wish these issues to be part of EPAs negotiations and, apart from services, 
these issues remain outside the ambit of the WTO. Within the Cotonou Agreement there is 
only an agreement to discuss co-operation not to agree binding rules (ibid.: 8-9). Again, there 
seems to be a lack of flexibility here on the EC‟s part, and an unwillingness to allow ACP 
countries the flexibility to negotiate on these issues at their choice and speed. This is exactly 
the concern of the U.K.‟s International Development Committee which has expressed its 
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view that the EU is abusing its position on this issue (IDC 2007: 14), and DFID in the U.K. is 
similarly concerned.
12
 
 
The fifth and final issue is to do with aid. Given that there are, as already noted above, a 
series of supply side constraints such as poor infrastructure, weak production capacity and 
low levels of human resources (Powell 2007: 4) that need to be addressed in any case to 
enable development in ACP countries, together with the adjustment costs that EPAs 
themselves would entail, aid has always been a part of the negotiations (Griffiths & Powell 
2007: 19). The core funding for supply side issues comes from the European Development 
Fund (EDF) but there is evidence that the tenth EDF, from which such funds would come, is 
both under-funded and will suffer a delayed start in 2010 leaving a two year gap between it 
and the ninth EDF (Powell 2007: 45). The EU has also promised further aid targeted 
specifically as “aid for trade”, planned to reach €2 billion by 2010.13  However, the issue of 
contention has been the extent to which such aid is being made conditional on signing EPAs. 
Not surprisingly, the two sides differ – DFID is explicit in stating that the EC‟s position is 
that “aid for trade is not conditional on EPAs”,14 while those reporting the ACP position are 
equally unequivocal in stating that, “aid is clearly being offered on condition of commitments 
made in EPAs” (Powell 2007: 45). 
 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of this particular issue, there remains the fact that 
negotiations over EPAs have become highly contentious and politicised. The effects on 
regional integration, the need for reform in institutional frameworks, the estimated direct 
trade and fiscal effects of EPAs, together with the introduction or otherwise of the Singapore 
issues and the amount and conditionality of aid, all make for a complex situation where any 
assessments of fairness or unfairness are clearly not straightforward. However, NGOs have 
traditionally seen their role as cutting through the complexities and running campaigns to 
highlight what they perceive to be gross injustices. Before turning to issues of fairness, a brief 
look at the campaign against EPAs is worthwhile. 
 
 
The “Stop EPAs” campaign 
 
Once negotiations on EPAs had begun in September 2002 African organisations became 
concerned at the potential effects of these new agreements and contacted European charities 
to help. In 2004, after two years of detailed analysis, the “Stop EPAs” campaign was born 
(Traidcraft 2008). Since then an orchestrated campaign involving many organisations linked 
to the Trade Justice Movement (TJM),
15
 has attempted at the very least to ensure that „fair‟ 
EPAs were negotiated or that alternatives such as EBAs and GSP+ were introduced to allow 
more time for the negotiations over EPAs themselves. It is not clear that the campaign ever 
had the objective or thought that it might actually “stop EPAs” from occurring, but in the 
nature of NGOs and campaigning a snappy title is more important than accuracy. Similarly, 
the content of some of the campaigning material expresses the enormous complexity of the 
issue in rather more bite-sized language. A briefing for U.K. MP‟s by the TJM issued in 
September 2007, for example, stated that “If [EPAs] are not changed dramatically in the next 
                                                 
12
 See www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/economic-partnership-agreements-myths.asp, accessed 
12/12/08. 
13
 See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r13002.htm, accessed 12/12/08. 
14
 See www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/economic-partnership-agreements-myths.asp, accessed 
12/12/08. 
15
 See http://www.tjm.org.uk, accessed 12/12/08. 
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few months, they will threaten the futures of up to 750 million people” – quite what “threaten 
the futures” means in practice is far from clear.  
 
This is not to say that the campaign has not had the intellectual weight behind it that such 
campaigns deserve – two extensive reports (Griffiths & Powell 2007, Powell 2007) have 
already been cited from above. One of these reports had as its focus not so much the content 
of the EPA negotiations but the manner in which they have been conducted – an approach 
that is described as “undermining partnership” (Griffiths & Powell 2007: 13). The claim is 
that in the dismissive approach to ACP proposals, the disregard for ACP institutions and 
processes, the forcing of negotiation on the Singapore issues, the manipulation of the 
prospect of aid, the threat of loss of market access, the refusal to consider alternatives, the 
exclusion of dissenting voices and the imposition of deadlines before development, the EC‟s 
conduct has been far from exemplary. This is an interesting and unusual „process‟ report 
which ends by placing the onus on EU states “to rein in the [European] Commission and 
insist upon a fundamentally different approach, based on non-reciprocity” (ibid.: 31). The 
issue of process is one that we will return to below. 
 
 
EPAs – the current situation 
 
The situation with regard to which EPAs had been signed was, of course, changing rapidly as 
the 31
st
 December 2007 deadline came and passed. The position as of the date of writing in 
December 2008 (one year after the supposed deadline), is shown in Appendix 2 where it may 
be seen that 35 countries in total out of 76 (46%) have signed EPAs. Of these, however, only 
9 out of 39 (23%) are LDCs, whereas 26 out of 37 (70%) non-LDCs have signed. Given the 
option for LDCs to use EBA, making essentially no difference to their previous position 
under the Cotonou Agreement, it is not surprising that many have opted not to sign. Equally 
predictable is the number of non-LDCs which have signed given that their alternative GSP+ 
gives less favourable access to the EU market and would thus lead to a decline in their export 
earnings. In terms of regional groupings, only the Caribbean has signed in its entirety, but 
given the presence of only one LDC (Haiti) in a group of 15 countries this is equally not 
surprising. 
 
As noted in Appendix 2, the regional groupings that have signed EPAs are slightly different 
from the original groupings with which the EC was negotiating. Thus, seven EPAs have been 
signed in total.
16
 Of these, only one – the Caribbean EPA – is considered to be a full or 
comprehensive EPA by the EC. The Caribbean EPA includes not just provisions for trade in 
goods, which were, of course, essential to comply with WTO rules, but services, investment, 
competition and public procurement aspects – in other words the contentious “Singapore” 
issues. The remaining six EPAs are regarded as “interim” in that they focus on goods only, 
but mostly include clauses to allow negotiations to continue on these other areas.
17
 These 
                                                 
16
 The seven are: West Africa (Ghana, Ivory Coast); Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(Cameroon); East African Community (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda); East and Southern 
Africa (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe); Southern African Development 
Community (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland); Caribbean (all countries – see 
Appendix 1); Pacific (Fiji and Papua New Guinea), www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/epas-progress-
update.asp, accessed 12/12/08. 
17
 See www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/epas-progress-update.asp, accessed 12/12/08. An alternative 
web-site for regular up-dates can be found at www.acp-eu-trade.org. See also 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/regneg_en.htm. 
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Interim EPAs (IEPAs) have only been initialled rather than signed – an important difference 
since although the negotiations have come to a conclusion there is still a formal ratification 
process to be undertaken. 
 
In a recent assessment of the legal texts of the EPAs that have been signed or initialled 
(Oxfam 2008), it is claimed that these are not development friendly. While the actual impact 
on those countries which have not signed EPAs at present has been small (ibid.: 8), the 
projected effects of EPAs themselves are generally felt to be against the interests of ACP 
countries. The liberalisation of goods is higher than Europe originally proposed, at between 
67% and 83% of trade, although the timescales vary between 0 and 25 years (ibid.: 14). 
Regional disintegration is predicted (ibid.: 17), and ACP countries will be left worse off 
financially with a need for significant aid to upgrade basic infrastructure (ibid.: 19). The 
conclusion is that the initialled EPA deals “fail the „development test‟. Far from restructuring 
economic relationships to stimulate development, they risk locking ACP countries into 
current patterns of inequality and marginalisation, and further bias the multilateral trading 
system against the interests of developing countries” (ibid.: 34). While much of this is 
familiar from the earlier discussions, it is of note that Oxfam calls for “renegotiation of any 
aspect of the initialled EPAs … to reduce the deals to the minimum needed for WTO 
compliance” (ibid.: 38). Despite the 31st December 2007 deadline, the initialling process 
seems to have bought time with the WTO, and may now allow the opportunity for further 
negotiations. 
 
 
Assessing fairness in international trade 
 
As noted at the outset, the inherent complexity of the situation described above rules out any 
simplistic application of fairness principles. So, we begin by looking at fairness principles 
themselves to see what light might be shed by such a review, before turning to their 
application. And while fairness has, of course, been the subject of much philosophical debate 
in general, it has also been the subject of discussion specifically in relation to international 
trade (Brown & Stern 2007, Davidson et al. 2006, de Jasay 2006, Franck 1995, Maseland & 
de Vaal 2002; 2003, Narliker 2006, Ochieng 2007, Suranovic 2000). Much of this originates 
in the economics literature, from which three points are worth noting immediately. The first 
is that economists frequently “dismiss notions of rights, justice and fairness as, at best, 
muddled, and more likely welfare worsening” and that the most characteristic normative 
method adopted by economists is “straightforward individualistic utilitarian 
consequentialism” (Davidson et al. 2006: 989). This „free market‟ position, of course, lends 
strong support to trade liberalisation and opposes protectionism in all its forms. And 
protectionism is the second point worthy of note, for „fair trade‟ is often contrasted with „free 
trade‟ to denote protectionism which seeks to mitigate the effects of international competitors 
on domestic industries (see, for example, Bhagwati 1995, Maseland & de Vaal 2002, Howse 
& Trebilcock 1996). This understanding of fair trade gives rise to the view that fair traders 
are “charlatans (protectionists masquerading as moralists)” (Howse & Trebilcock 1996: 61). 
 
However, while we can dismiss this particular use of the term fairness, it is clear that issues 
of fairness do play “a non-trivial role in the politics of trade policy” (Davidson et al. 2006: 
990) so that questions such as, “Is it fair for all countries to be held to the same set of 
standards when these countries are at different levels of economic development?”, or “What 
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are fair responses to the imminent changes in world trading patterns?” (Suranovic 2000: 283), 
or of direct relevance to this chapter, “Are EPAs fair?”, are entirely legitimate. And the third 
point to note stems from this. As Franck (1995) has observed, for any discourse on fairness to 
take place, two preconditions must exist. The first is moderate scarcity: “Discussion about 
fairness … is most likely to be productive when the allocation of rights and duties occurs in 
circumstances which make allocation both necessary and possible. This circumstance … John 
Rawls has aptly called a condition of „moderate scarcity‟” (ibid.: 9). The second precondition 
is community: “It is only in community that the bedrock of shared values and developed 
principles necessary to any assessment of fairness is found” (ibid.: 10). And in Franck‟s view 
“we are witnessing the dawn of a new era, defined both by moderate scarcity and by an 
emerging sense of global community” (ibid.: 11). In other words, the preconditions are now 
met and the time is right for substantive discussion about fairness in international trade. 
 
With this as background, we can turn to fairness principles themselves. And we find, not 
surprisingly, that these divide into the conventional distinction between procedural and 
distributive fairness – although „justice‟ is often used instead of fairness, a point to which we 
will return. That fairness has two dimensions – the process by which outcomes are derived 
and the outcomes themselves – is, of course, a common-place, but it is worth exploring some 
of the nuances that emerge within this distinction.  
 
On the procedural side, Suranovic (2000), amongst the seven fairness principles that he 
derives,
18
 gives four that relate to procedural fairness. These are non-discrimination fairness 
(where, if one group is allowed to take some action, then all other groups deemed to be equal 
should be similarly allowed – ibid.: 288); Golden Rule fairness (based on Kant‟s categorical 
imperative, where an agent should take some action which has an effect on another only if 
that agent is willing to have another agent take a comparable action with the identical effect 
on himself  – ibid.: 291); and positive and negative reciprocity fairness (where agents 
exchange either positive „you scratch my back and I‟ll scratch yours‟, or negative „tit for tat‟ 
actions – ibid.: 295, 299). Brown & Stern (2007: 299-302) also discuss reciprocity noting 
that, understood as “rough equivalence”, it remains an important criterion for negotiations in 
international trade. 
 
Maseland & de Vaal (2002) make a distinction of fairness along deontological versus 
consequentialist grounds, the latter of which we will return to under distributive fairness, but 
the former of which is worth noting now. Essentially it is to do with the “conditions under 
which trade, and the production of traded goods, should minimally take place” (ibid.: 254). In 
a later paper they refer to this as “principle” fairness (Maseland & de Vaal 2003) and identify 
it as being trade conducted in compliance with designated basic prohibitions such as the 
absence of child labour or environmentally harmful production methods. They note that, 
while free trade can lead to the absence of such conditions, for instance because it raises 
incomes, it lacks a self-regulating mechanism to ensure such conditions are met. It therefore 
seems appropriate to categorise it here, under procedural fairness, because of the procedural 
requirements to enforce such compliance and because the overall outcome that follows may 
not necessarily be efficient – a distributive matter. 
 
Legitimacy fairness is another way of describing procedural fairness (Franck 1995: 7-8, 
Narlikar 2006: 1007-8), a point that Elsig (2007: 81) using the term “input legitimacy” makes 
                                                 
18
 Suranovic (2000) divides these seven into two categories: equality fairness and reciprocity fairness. I will 
cover six of the seven here, the seventh being privacy fairness – “an agent should be free to take any action 
which has effects only on himself” (ibid.: 301) 
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in relation to the WTO, and to which we will also return. Meanwhile, Brown & Stern refer to 
“equality of opportunity” as a procedural issue noting, however, that they do not advance it as 
a high moral principle but merely an “instrumental criterion to be valued for its 
consequences, namely that it facilitates the reaching of inter-governmental agreements that 
protect and enhance the mutually advantageous trading system” (2007: 295). This 
relationship between the two forms of fairness is also something to which we will need to 
return. 
 
On the distributive side many of the authors already cited note the importance of outcomes 
for fairness assessments (Brown & Stern 2007, Maseland & de Vaal 2002; 2003, Narlikar 
2006, Ochieng 2007, Suranovic 2000) and it is in relation to this discussion that economists 
refer to the concepts of welfare efficiency and Pareto optimality: 
 
 “For many economists – borrowing from welfare theory – a practically acceptable 
criterion of fairness would be that the trade negotiations result in a more efficient 
global economy. Greater efficiency is defined as a movement towards Pareto 
optimality and, in the context of international trade, such a state would be reached 
when no country can be made better off without some other country being made 
worse off” (Brown & Stern 2007: 296). 
 
An alternative expression of this is to refer to “maximum benefit fairness” (Suranovic 2000: 
302-4), in which the utilitarian rhetorical device of “the greatest good for the greatest 
number” is, in effect, applied irrespective of the consequences for affected minorities. 
 
However, another distributional principle that is included in the literature is perhaps best 
termed “poverty alleviation fairness” (Maseland & de Vaal 2003) and is one in which 
“beneficial consequences for the poorest groups in the world” (Maseland & de Vaal 2002: 
256) are to be taken into account. As Maseland & de Vaal note, this concept draws on 
Rawlsian thinking and attempts to combine Pareto optimality with the idea that “the only 
inequality a rational individual would accept is the minimum inequality necessary to improve 
the situation of the least well off in society” (ibid.: 256). Franck refers to this as the 
„maximin‟ principle (1995: 18-19) and notes that it is a neo-egalitarian principle of 
distributive fairness. In relation to the fairness of EPAs this will clearly be an important 
concept, but is also one that acknowledges the “unequal starting positions” (Maseland & de 
Vaal 2003) of different countries. While a Nozickian approach would ignore such 
inequalities, it would seem to be very much to the point that they be included in any 
consideration of the fairness of international trade. This is not to argue for a socialist 
redistribution of input factors (even were that to be possible), but for negative consequences 
of inequalities to be at least taken into account (see Maseland & de Vaal 2002: 255-6). 
 
An attempt at resolving the terminological issue that we noted above between fairness and 
justice is made by de Jasay (2006). He argues, in effect, that justice refers to procedural 
issues, while fairness refers to outcomes. On this basis (one that is by no means universal) he 
is able to argue that trade made fair by regulation violates freedom of contract and as such is 
an injustice (ibid.: 175-6). In other words, fair is not, or is not necessarily, just (and vice-
versa). While we do not particularly need to follow the terminology here, the point is 
important – that procedural and distributive fairness do not necessarily follow one another 
with one leading automatically to the other, but are different aspects of fairness which may 
not coincide (Franck 1995: 22). Franck makes the further point that they may not even pull in 
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the same direction, since distributive fairness is likely to lead to change, whereas procedural 
fairness tends towards stability (ibid.: 7).  
 
However, it is often the case that both forms of fairness are needed if true fairness is to result 
– Elsig (2007), for example, refers to the need to balance what he calls input and output 
legitimacy in the WTO. Stiglitz & Charlton‟s set of principles (cited in Brown & Stern 2007: 
312-3), in relation to the Doha Development round of the WTO, provide a further example. It 
is clear that the first two are to do with distributive fairness while the last two are procedural 
in nature: 
 
1. Any agreement should be assessed in terms of its impact on development; items with 
a negative effect on development should not be on the agenda; 
2. Any agreement should be fair (i.e. that the outcome should provide a larger share of 
aggregate benefits to the poorer countries); 
3. Any agreement should be fairly arrived at; 
4. Any agreement should be limited in scope (i.e. preventing unwarranted intrusions into 
national sovereignty). 
 
While this completes a brief summary of fairness principles as covered in the relevant 
literature, there is one further and important area that we need to consider before we turn to 
an assessment of the fairness of EPAs. In some ways this takes us back to one of the two 
preconditions that Franck identified – that it is “only in community that the bedrock of shared 
values and developed principles necessary to any assessment of fairness is found” (Franck 
1995: 10). The question that this raises is really an Aristotelian one, and so differs from the 
Enlightenment concepts of fairness discussed so far, and over which perhaps limited 
agreement can be reached.  
 
The Aristotelian question is always to do with what makes for the flourishing of life as a 
whole both individually and in community. It therefore asks questions of purpose and 
relationship and is, in that sense, essentially teleological. Modern work on virtue ethics, as it 
is known (MacIntyre 2007), and as applied at the level of business organisations rather than 
trade per se (Moore & Beadle 2006, Moore 2009) focuses on such a teleological approach 
and encourages the pursuit of excellence rather than the “levelling tendency” that 
deontological ethics has been charged with (Koehn 1995: 537). In terms of something 
essentially practical like the negotiation of EPAs this will encourage us to ask what the 
purpose of such agreements are, how they support and benefit community both within 
developing countries and between developing and developed countries, and what excellence 
means in this context. It is probably apparent that questions such as these take us beyond the 
conventional approaches to ethics via the fairness discourse, but also that they have 
something in common with the teleological approach to interpretation of WTO laws taken by 
ACP countries, as noted above. 
 
 
An assessment of the fairness of EPAs 
 
From all that has been said above, it will come as no surprise that the fairness assessments 
that can be made are somewhat tentative. But the reasons for such tentativeness will be 
become clearer as we proceed, so we begin by considering issues of procedural fairness. The 
most extensive consideration of this is given in Griffith & Powell (2007), covered above in 
the “Stop EPAs” section. In “undermining partnership” through the eight procedural issues 
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that were identified, in all of which the EC was regarded as being at fault, procedural fairness 
seems to have been compromised by the EC. That, at first sight, might seem a straightforward 
and incontrovertible judgment. 
 
However, in considering WTO negotiations in general (of which EPAs can be viewed in this 
context as a separate but inter-related part), the situation becomes less clear-cut. Narlikar 
(2006: 1009) argues that the WTO has, in general, paid limited homage to the fairness 
discourse but “particularly its distributive justice component”. In other words, the WTO, 
where it has included fairness considerations, has focused on procedural fairness, and has 
done so partly because any notion of redistributive justice through global trade has sat 
uneasily with “more liberal trade principles” and “with the national interests of already 
institutionalised countries” (Ochieng 2007: 389). Narlikar reinforces this point: “even if 
provisions in the WTO on distributional fairness are few, … its dedication to fair process, 
order and legitimacy is borne out in its rules of non-discrimination and reciprocity” (2006: 
1009). The concerns of the EC in ensuring that EPAs were WTO-compatible, and awareness 
of the procedural unfairness associated with the fact that such non-reciprocal agreements 
discriminated against non-ACP states, are further evidence of this approach. 
 
Ochieng notes that even by the early 1990s “developing countries had been forced to change 
tack, toning down on the notion of fairness of outcomes and moving towards accommodating 
the fairness of process concept (even whilst complaining that WTO processes were not fair to 
them)” (Ochieng 2007: 389, emphasis in original). It seems, therefore, that developing 
countries might have been better prepared for negotiating on EPAs, having accepted that this 
would be the focus of the EC in such negotiations. Being better prepared might have helped 
the ACP countries to negotiate more forcefully and within the reasonable time periods laid 
down in the Cotonou Agreement. 
 
Accepting that ACP countries might have expected the EC to focus on procedural issues does 
not, however, mean that they would or should have abandoned their interest in distributive 
fairness. Narlikar (2006: 1028), indeed, suggests that developing countries generally have had 
some success in maintaining a focus on distributive fairness and that this may lead to the 
reintroduction of the fairness-as-equity discourse into the WTO, with the Doha Development 
Agenda as an indicator of this. Elsig, however, recognises the link between the two forms of 
fairness arguing that “the input side should not be neglected as the belief in fair processes 
potentially increases the rate of compliance with negotiated treaties, thus increasing output 
legitimacy” (2007: 89). 
 
However, allowing for the continuing asymmetries in the WTO and the continuing 
complaints of the developing countries over equity of process (Narlikar 2006: 1024-5), and 
therefore their likely extension into negotiations over EPAs, it seems probable that procedural 
fairness has been compromised during the process. The attempt (and success with the 
Caribbean grouping) to bring the Singapore issues onto the agenda, and the attempt to 
introduce conditionality on aid strengthens the suspicion that EPAs have not been fairly 
negotiated. 
 
What, then, of distributive fairness? While, of course, the judgment in this case has to be 
tentative until actual outcomes are known, the evidence cited above in relation to the likely 
negative impact on regional integration especially in Africa; on the timing of the introduction 
of EPAs in relation to the poor institutional quality which is likely to mean, again, that 
African countries are not in a position to benefit from trade liberalisation; and the more 
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general trade and fiscal effects, all suggest that the distributive outcomes will not benefit 
ACP countries.  
 
The counter argument to this, however, is the potential distributive unfairness that non-ACP, 
non-LDC countries have been experiencing (following the procedural unfairness noted 
above) – and hence the reason that they have been watching the EPA negotiations “like 
hawks” (Mandelson 2007, cited above) and might mount a legal challenge under Article 
XXIV. The EU countries, and on their behalf the EC, have, they would argue, been 
negotiating on EPAs in order to ensure that a WTO-compatible legal basis on which 
continuing preferential treatment of ACP countries could be provided. It is not their fault, 
they can argue, that the WTO requires reciprocity on substantially all trade within a 
reasonable period. In addition, the extended time periods (at least 10 years and possibly up to 
25 – see above) allowable within EPAs for SAT to be realised would, the EU states might 
well argue, give both sufficient time and incentive to resolve the institutional development 
and other issues.  
 
That it is in both the developing and developed countries‟ interests ultimately to make 
significant progress on trade liberalisation is something both sides can probably agree on. 
That EPAs are necessary in this is something developing countries, with the exception of the 
Caribbean grouping, are clearly more reluctant to agree on. That EPAs are likely to lead to 
appropriate and substantive development, and therefore to distributive fairness, is something 
that the two sides are, again with the possible exception of the Caribbean grouping, at odds 
over and only time will tell which side is right. 
 
Within this debate, however, the issues of community and purpose, the Aristotelian questions, 
seem rarely to get asked, with sides being taken and personal advantage being sought. This 
takes us back to the different interpretations of WTO laws discussed in the background 
section above. Here, it would seem that the ACP‟s teleological approach is the more 
appropriate. The ACP states see the WTO as developmentally oriented while the EC and 
other developed countries see it as solely a trade organisation. Although not explicit, it could 
be argued that the ACP countries see the “dawn of a new era” characterised by “an emerging 
sense of global community” (Franck 1995: 11, cited above), and would argue for notions of 
excellence in international trade to emerge. Such excellence might well include the flexibility 
necessary to recognise the different starting positions and speed of development that 
developing countries in general, and LDCs in particular, are capable of, and to design 
processes that would allow such flexibility – a key point of concern noted on a number of 
occasions above. To achieve this flexibility, while still enabling regional integration, is 
obviously no simple task, but one that excellent trade negotiations and outcomes ought to 
seek. 
 
Perhaps, a more genuine attempt by the EC to take a developing country perspective, to seek 
to realise the purpose of EPAs and the Doha Development Round more generally as to do 
with sustainable development as we try to learn to live together on one earth, and to effect 
that through more community-minded initiatives that extend, if necessary, to other non-ACP 
countries, might have led not only to a process that was more acceptable to ACP countries 
but one in which the outcomes are more likely to be developmentally good. The opportunity 
for further negotiations may yet lead to such an outcome. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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I indicated at the outset that the conclusions that could be drawn would necessarily be 
somewhat tentative. It is difficult to be conclusive in such a fast-moving and complex area. 
However, while the evidence is generally against the EC and, behind it, the EU states, it does 
seem that both „sides‟ may have lessons to learn from EPAs over both the process of 
negotiating and the outcomes that are sought, even though the actual outcomes may in some 
cases be many years away from being realised. The existing conceptualisations of fairness, 
based on Enlightenment principles, provide a basic mechanism by which such fairness claims 
can be examined, but they do not take sufficient account of the purposive and community 
aspects of international trade negotiations. Perhaps here, as EPAs continue to be negotiated 
and these agreements are implemented, there is a chance for something developmentally 
beneficial to emerge. This will require the EC to focus more on distributive fairness, and 
accept the changes that will necessarily accompany this, rather than rely upon the stability 
that arises from procedural fairness considerations. 
 
Within this, there is a potential knock-on effect on the WTO itself. As Ochieng concludes, 
“development-oriented EPAs will require not only innovations in their design and scope but 
also innovative interpretation of existing WTO rules or innovations to some of the existing 
WTO rules, most notably, Article XXIV and a wide array of other SDT provisions” (2007: 
395). Hence, one of the benefits of EPAs may be to challenge the WTO and the EU‟s 
conservative interpretation of its purpose, and lead to international trade that is, indeed, not 
just procedurally fair in its negotiation and distributively fair in its implementation, but also 
genuinely develops the global community.
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Appendix 1 
ACP Countries by regional groupings 
 
 
  ECOWAS CEMAC ESA SADC Caribbean Pacific 
1 
 
Benin Cameroon Burundi Angola 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Cook Is. 
2 Burkina Faso 
Central African 
Republic 
Comoros Botswana Bahamas 
Fed. 
Micron. 
3 
 
Cape Verde Chad Djibouti Lesotho Barbados Fiji 
4 Gambia 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
Eritrea Mozambique Belize Kiribati 
5 Ghana 
Congo (Dem. 
Rep.- 
Kinshasa) 
Ethiopia Namibia Dominica Marshall Is. 
6 Guinea 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Kenya Swaziland 
Dominican 
Rep. 
Nauru 
7 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Gabon Malawi Tanzania Grenada Niue 
8 Ivory Coast 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
Mauritius South Africa Guyana Palau 
9 
 
Liberia  Madagascar  Haiti 
Papua New 
Guinea 
10 
 
Mali  Rwanda  Jamaica Samoa 
11 
 
Mauritania  Seychelles  
St. Kitts & 
Nevis  
Solomon Is. 
12 
 
Niger  Sudan  St Lucia Tonga 
13 
Nigeria 
 
 Uganda  
St Vincent & 
the 
Grenadines 
Tuvalu 
14 
 
Senegal  Zambia  Surinam Vanuatu 
15 Sierra Leone  Zimbabwe  
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
 
16 
 
Togo      
No. 
LDCs 
13 5 11 4 1 5 
  
Note:  Countries in italics are Least Developed Countries (LDCs) – 39 out of a total of 76. 
 
Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/plcg_en.htm, accessed 12/12/08 
www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/epas-progress-update.asp, accessed 
12/12/08, and Lang 2006: 36-38. 
 
Key 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
ESA  Eastern and Southern Africa 
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SADC  Southern African Development Community
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Appendix 2 
 
Signatories to Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
 
  ECOWAS CEMAC ESA SADC Caribbean Pacific 
1 
 
Ghana Cameroon Burundi Botswana 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Fiji 
2 Ivory Coast  Comoros Lesotho Bahamas 
Papua New 
Guinea 
3 
 
  Kenya Mozambique Barbados  
4   
Mauritius 
 
Namibia Belize  
5   
Madagascar 
 
Swaziland Dominica  
6   Rwanda Tanzania 
Dominican 
Rep. 
 
7   
Seychelles 
 
 
Grenada 
 
 
8   Uganda  
Guyana 
 
 
9 
 
  Zimbabwe  Haiti  
10 
 
    Jamaica  
11 
 
    
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
 
12 
 
    St Lucia  
13     
St Vincent & 
the 
Grenadines 
 
14 
 
    Surinam  
15     
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
 
16 
 
      
No. LDCs 
 
0 0 5 3 1 0 
  
Note:  Countries in italics are Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Only 9 from a possible 
39 LDCs have signed EPAs; for non-LDCs the number is 26 from 37. 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/regneg_en.htm, accessed 
12/12/08. The web-site gives slightly different groupings from those shown in 
Appendix 1. For ease of comparison, the same groupings are maintained.  
. 
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